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566 PEOPLE fl. RISER 
[Crim. No. 5896. In Bank. Dee. 31, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent v.RICHARD G. RISER, 
Appellant. 
(1] Homicide-P1Ulishment.-Pen. Code, § 190, relating to punish-
ment for murder in the first degree, does not impose the death 
penalty, leaving discretion with the jury to substitute a lesser 
penalty; it imposes neither death nor life imprisonment, but 
with a perfectly even hand presents the two alternatives to 
the jury. 
[2] Id.-Punishment.-Pen. Code, § 190, relating to punishment 
for first degree murder, calls for the exercise by the jurors 
of a legal discretion in choosing between imposition of either 
the death penalty or life imprisonment, not for the unswerving 
application of views formulated before trial that will compel 
a certain result no matter what the trial may reveal. 
[3] J'ury-Challenges.-Pen. Code, § 1074, subd. 8, authorizing chal-
lenge of a prospective juror for implied bias if the offense 
eharged be punishable with death and he entertains such con-
scientious opinions as would preclude his finding defendant 
.guilty, does not literally compel the exclnsion of jurors in-
capable of exercising the discretion contemplated by Pen. 
Code, § 190, relating to punishment for first degree murder, 
but it would be doing violence to the purpose of these sections 
to construe § 1074, subd. 8, to permit such jurors to serve, 
since this would work a de facto abolition of capital punish-
ment. 
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons 
and Instruments of Orime.-Expert testimony that .38 special 
shells containing bullets that were copper-coated factory loads 
resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet found 
at the scene of the murder charged and were of the same 
type and from the same manufacturer, together with the prose-
cution's showing that the .38 shells found in a codefendant's 
brief case would fit the type of revolver known to have been 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 321 et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 2-4; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 718. 
McR:. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide, § 242; [3] Jury, § 103 
(7); [4-8] Criminal Law, § 536(1); [9] Criminal Law, § 1382(23); 
[10] Criminal Law, § 393(2); [11] Criminal Law, § 393(3); (12) 
Criminal Law, § 1432; [13] Criminal Law, § 1266; [14-16) Criminal 
Law, §534; [17,31] Criminal Law, §544; [18] Homicide, §183; 
[19] Homicide, § 267; [20-22] Homicide, § 236; [23) Criminal 
Law, § 565; 24-26, 28, 29] Criminal Law, § 271; [27] Witnesses, 
§§ 202,244; [30] Criminal Law, § 136L 
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used in the killings, justified the court's admitting the factory 
loads. 
[5] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and Instru-
ments of Crime.-Expert testimony that hand-cast bullets in .38 
special shells found at the scene of the crime bore "a remark-
able resemblance" to those found in a codefendant's brief case, 
and were probably poured from the same batch of lead, justified 
their admission in evidence. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and In-
struments of Crime.-Where the murder charged was done 
with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, which was 
never recovered, and there was expert testimony that a holster 
found in a codefendant's brief case indicated that it had once 
carried such a revolver, possession of the holster was relevant 
to the issue of possession of the murder weapon. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and In-
struments of Crime.-When a specific type of weapon used 
to commit a homicide is not known, it may be permissible to 
admit into evidence weapons found in defendant's possession 
Bome time after the crime that could have been the weapons 
employed, and there Deed be DO conclusive demonstration 
that the weapon in defendant's possession was the murder 
weapon. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Weapons and In-
struments of Orime.-When the prosecution relies on a specific 
type of weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other 
weapons were found in defendant's possession, since such evi-
dence tends to show, Dot that he committed the crime, but 
only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons. 
[9] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Demonstrative Evi-
dence.-Where the murder charged was. done with a Smith and 
Wesson .88 Special revolver, which was never recovered, and 
.38 special shells and a holster found in a codefendant's brief 
case were properly admitted in evidence, and from such evi-
dence the jury would have concluded that defendant pos-
sessed firearms, he was not prejudiced by error in admission 
of a loaded Colt .38 revolver, a box of .22 shells, two other 
holsters and two ammunition belts found in his possession, 
since the .38 shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith and 
Wesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the jury 
might more easily have concluded that the ammunition was 
kept for a Smith and Wesson. 
[10] Id.-Evidence-Other Orimes.-Evidence of other crimes is 
not admissible when its sole effect is to show a criminal dis-
position, but if it tends logically and by reasonable inference 
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137; Am.Jur., Evidence, § all 
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to establish any taet material for the prosecution or to over-
come any material fact sought to be proved by the defense, it is 
admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense 
not ~cluded in the charge. 
[11] Id.-Evidenee-Other Crimes.-Where the murder charged 
was done with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, which 
was never recovered, and there was evidence that at the time 
of commission of a prior offense defendants had been in 
the possession of three guns and that only two of these were 
known not to have been Smith and Wesson .38 Specials, a 
P38 automatic was admissible to corroborate testimony that 
defendants acquired such weapon at a time when they already 
had two guns, such evidence that defendants had a third gun 
of unknown make being relevant to show that they had the 
means to commit the crime. 
[12] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-lDstructions-
Evidenee.-In a prosecution for murder, defendant could not 
successfully complain that the court should have immediately 
instructed the jury that a codefendant's references to his 
participation in previous robberies eould not be used against 
him since the prosecution did not show that he had been 
present when codefendant was interrogated, where throughout 
the trial the court, when requested to do so, instructed clearly 
that statements made by one defendant were not evidence 
against another defendant who had not been present, and 
repeated this warning in its general instructions at the close 
of the trial, and where defendant did not request the court 
to repeat its warning at this particular juncture. 
[1S] ld.-Appeal-Who May Urge Errors-Errors Meeting Co-
defendant.-Defendant may not complain that it was mis-
conduct for the prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that a 
codefendant had in fact made the statements attributed to him 
where the injury, if any, was to such codefendant whose 
appeal is not before the appellate court. 
[14] ld.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preljmjnary Proof. 
-The party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative 
evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at 
the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis 
there has been no substitution or tampering. . 
[15] ld.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof. 
-The burden on the party offering demonstrative evidence is 
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all 
the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty 
with which the particular evidence could have been altered, 
it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration, and the 
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital 
link in the chain of possession is not accounted for. 
') 
) 
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[16] Id.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof. 
-When it is the barest speculation that there was tampering 
with demonstrative evidence, it is proper to admit the evidence 
and let what doubt remains go to its weight. 
[17] Id. - Evidence - Demonstrative Evidence - Fingerprints.-
Where defendant did not point to any indication of actual 
tampering with fingerprints on a bottle and glass testified to 
as being his, did not show how they could have been forged, 
and did not establish that anyone who might have been 
interested in tampering Jmew that the bottle and glass were 
in a deputy sheriff's unlocked book case for a few hours, it 
was not error to admit the bottle and glass in evidence. 
[18] Homicide - Instructions - Degree of Offense. - It was not 
error to instruct the jury that, although there are two degrees 
of murder, the evidence is such that either or both defendants 
are innocent of the charge of murder or that one or both of 
them are guilty of first degree murder, where the evidence 
was overwhelming that the homicide was committed in the 
perpetration of a robbery. 
[19] Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-InstructioDS.-Where the evi-
dence was such that defendant was guilty, if at all, of murder 
in the perpetration of a robbery and the jury was instructed 
that such offense was first degree murder, other instructions 
on the code definition of murder, including provisions on pre-
meditated murder and second degree murder, and the code 
definition of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 189, 211), were unneces-
sary, but if any confusion was generated by such instructions 
it could only have benefited defendant by leading the jury 
to think that the question of degree of murder was still open 
to its determination. 
[10] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury may not weigh the 
possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of 
accused in a murder case, but it may consider these conse-
quences in exercising its discretion to choose between different 
punishments. 
[21] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-It was not error for the 
court in a murder case to give the jury information about 
eligibility for parole before it had determined the question of 
guilt or innocence, where the court cautioned the jury against 
allowing such information to influence its determination of 
guilt. 
[22] Id.-InBtructions-Punishment.-It was not error in a prose-
cution for murder committed with a firearm to instruct the 
jury that defendant could be paroled in sevell years if sentenced 
to life imprisonment, since the provision of Pen. Code, § 8024, 
aubd. (b), fixing the minimum sentences for persons armed with 
deadly weapons at 10 years, is not concerned with how much of 
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a Bentence must be served before a prisoner is eligible for 
parole, and Pen. Code, 13048, limiting eligibility for parole 
when defendant has been adjudicated a habitual criminal, was 
not applicable where no prior convictions were charged in the 
indictment. 
[28] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Identit,-.-Evidence that after an 
eyewitness to a murder identified defendant in a police lineup 
as the man she had Been at the Bcene of the crime a police 
officer had been to her house on numerous occasions, showing 
her pictures of defendant, and that after her appearance 
before the grand jury the district attorney had discussed her 
testimony with her, was insufficient to justify a conclusion 
that her identification was the result of an idea planted in 
her mind by the prosecution. 
[24] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-When production 
I is sought by subpoena during trial of documents referred to 
on cross-examination, the question is not whether defendant 
will be allowed advance disclosure of evidence on which the 
prosecution plans to base its ease, but whether he will be 
allowed any disclosure of evidence that the prosecution does 
not intend to produce in court, and the possibility that defend-
ant will obtain perjured testimony or fabricated evidence as a 
result of disclosure at this point in the proceedings is too 
slight to justify denying production. 
[25] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-On a proper show-
ing a defendant in a criminal ease can compel production of a 
document when it becomes clear during the course of trial 
that the prosecution has in its possession relevant and 
material evidence. 
[26] ld.-Compelling Production of Evidence.-Absent some gov-
ernmental requirement that information be kept confldential 
for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the State has 
no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that 
can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has 
no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who 
have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly 
impeached as the evidence permits, and to deny flatly any 
right of production of documents in the prosecution's posses-
sion on the ground that an imbalance would be created be-
tween the advantages of prosecution and defense would be to 
lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertain-
ment of the facts. 
[27] Witnesses-Impeachment-Bias: Inconsistent Statements.-
Intended impeachment of prosecution witnesses justifying the 
compelling of production by the prosecution of a document is 
not necessarily restricted to impeachment by prior inconsistent 
statements to the exclusion, for example, of impeachment for 
bias. 
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[28a,28b] Criminal Law-Compelling Production of Evidence.-
The court in a murder case erred in vacating a subpoena duces 
tecum for production of documents in the prosecution's posses-
sion on the ground that the statements therein could not be 
used to impeach contrary testimony of witnesses, where it did 
not see the statements, and where, even if they were not signed, 
defendant might have been able to show, by the testimony 
of a stenographer or other witnesses or by admission of the 
witnesses themselves, that the statements had been accurately 
transcribed and therefore could be used for impeachment and 
where the prosecution could not claim that the necessities 
of law enforcement required that the statements be kept con-
fidential in view of the fact that the police had released 
the substance of the statements to the press. 
[29] Id.-Compel1ing Production of Evidence.-The proper test 
for determining whether production of a document must be 
granted is not whether the evidence has been conclusively 
proved admissible, but whether there is good reason to believe 
that the document when produced would be admissible in 
evidence for some purpose. 
[80a,80b] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Denying Production of 
Evidence.-Error in denying production of a document in the 
prosecution's possession with reference to prior inconsistent 
statements of eyewitnesses to the murder charged did not 
result in a miscarriage of justice where there was no reasonable 
probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict 
had defendant been allowed to introduce such statements in 
evidence, there being, in addition to fingerprints, evidence th3t 
defendant possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a 
common origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime, 
evidence that he had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38 
Special, the type of gun used in committing the crime, and 
ev:dence that he had had an unidentified gun in addition to 
those he admitted owning. 
[81] ld. - Evidence - Demonstrative Evidence - Fingerprints. -
Fingerprint evidence is the strongest evidence of identity, 
and is ordinarily sufficient alone to identify defendant. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. b) from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus 
County and from an order denying a new trial. Frank C. 
Damrell, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. ludgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty, affirmed. 
'\ 
1/ 
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William H. Coburn, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Richard G. Riser and his brother Roscoe 
R. Riser were charged by indictment with the murder of 
Earl and Pauline Hastings. The jury returned verdicts of 
guilty of murder in the first degree, without fixing the punish-
ment at life imprisonment in the case of Richard G. Riser. 
The court denied his motion for a new trial and sentenced 
him to death. His appeal to this court is automatic under 
section 1239, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code~ 
Just before midnight on July 11, 1955, Earl and Pauline 
Hastings, proprietors of the Hilltop Cafe near Oakdale in 
Stanislaus County, were shot and killed during the course of a 
robbery of their cafe. Mr. Basford, a customer, left the cafe 
about 11 :30 p. m. On his way out he passed two men who 
remarked that they were going in to have a beer. He was un-
able to identify either of the. men, but thought that they 
had driven up to the Hilltop in a two-tone Chrysler, Buick or 
Pontiac. 
When these men entered the cafe, the only persons present 
were two customers, Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel, both seated 
at the bar, and the Hastings. The men sat on stools at the end 
of the bar away from the other customers and ordered beers. 
After they had ordered a second round of beers, the shorter 
of the two rose from his stool, drew a gun, and announced, 
"This is a stick-up." The other man, who was also armed, 
silently took a position by the front door, while his companion 
went behind the bar where the Hastings were. . In an at-
tempt to prevent the robbery, Mr. Hastings seized a bottle and 
attacked the gunman. In the ensuing struggle Hastings was 
struck several times on the forehead and shot. The same 
gunman then shot and killed Mrs. Hastings, apparently as she 
was trying to reach a gun. Then he stepped over Mr. 
Hastings' body, rifled the cash register, and departed with the 
gunman at the door. 
The police arrived shortly after midnight, removed the 
bodies, and searched and photographed the premises. They 
recovered several bullets fired by the gunman, and dusted 
for fingerprints bottles and glasses found on the bar in front 
i of the stools used by the two men. 
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Mrs. Burgess identified Richard and Roscoe Riser as the 
two gunmen and testiDed that Richard had done the shooting. 
She admitted that she had been in the bar since 7 :30 p. m. 
and had had five beers, that the bar was quite dark, and 
that she could not see one of the men too well. Mr. Pantel 
testified that he thought Richard was the man who did the 
shooting, but was not positive; that he had not seen Roscoe 
before the police lineup at Stockton, and that the man at the 
door appeared to be of Filipino or Mexican extraction. Ex-
pert witnesses testified that fingerprints found on a bottle 
and a glass removed from the bar were the fingerprints of 
Richard Riser, and that bullets found in a brief case in 
Roscoe '8 Chrysler were similar in composition to bullets 
found at the scene of the crime. The killing had been done 
with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver. This gun was 
never recovered, but according to expert testimony a holster 
found in Roscoe's car had once carried a Smith and Wesson 
.38 Special revolver. The brothers' defense was an alibi: 
that they had been in Stockton on the night of July 11th. 
During the voir dire examination of jurors, Hardy M. 
Dunavin stated that he did not believe in capital punishment, 
that nothing would prevent his finding defendant guilty if 
the evidence warranted it, but that in no event would he vote 
for the death penalty. In response to the court's question 
whether he entertained conscientious scruples that would pre-
vent his finding defendant guilty if the offense charged could 
be punishable with death, he replied, "No." On the basis of 
these answers, and over defendant's objection, the court 
sustained a challenge by the prosecution under section 1074, 
subdivision 8, of the Penal Code. 
Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A challenge 
for implied bias may be taken for all or any of the following 
causes, and for no other . . . 8. If the offense charged be 
punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty; 
in which case he must neither be permitted nor compelled 
to serve as a juror." Defendant contends that, although 
this provision requires the exclusion of jurors whose deter-
mination of guilt would be affected by their views of capital 
punishment, neither its language nor its policy require the 
exclusion of those whose assessment of punishment alone would 
be influenced, and that section 190 in providing that a person 
found guilty of murder in the first degree "shall suffer death, 
-or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion 
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of the jury ••• " has made the determination of guilt and 
the assessment of punishment separate questions. The prose-
cution contends that the statute and decisions of this court 
require exclusion even when scruples go only to the assess-
ment of punishment. 
In support of its position the prosecution cites People v . 
.Ah Ohung, 54 Cal. 398, 402, and People v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 
531, 535 [66 P. 794], where this court upheld challenges 
under section 1074, subdivision 8. In neither of those cases, 
however, would the effect of the juror's opinion have been 
confined to the assessment of punishment. Because the jurors 
stated that they would not find the defendants guilty on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence alone when the penalty 
might be death, it was clear that although they were not un-
qualifiedly opposed to capital punishment, their views of its 
seriousness would affect their weighing the evidence in the 
determination of guilt. (See also People v. Warner, 147 
Cal. 546, 550 [82 P. 196].) 
Likewise distinguishable is People v. Oe'buUa, 137 Cal. 314, 
317 [70 P. 181], because the juror there stated that his con-
science would not permit him to bring in a verdict of guilty. 
Since the practical effect of permitting such a juror to ·serve 
would be to assure acquittal, the distinction between his state 
of mind and that of juror Dunavin in the present case is not 
merely verbal. For the same reason People v. Sanchez, 24 
Cal. 17, 22, People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 346 [19 P. 161], 
and People v. Mille,., 177 Cal. 404, 407 [170 P. 817], are not 
direct authority in the present situation. In each of these 
cases the juror stated that his conscientious opinion would 
affect his determination of guilt. The Sanchez case came at 
a time when the jury had no discretion to fix the punishment, 
so that the only way a juror could effectively express his 
opposition to capital punishment was by finding the defend-
ant not guilty. Similarly in the Goldenson and Miller cases, 
although the jury had by then been given discretion to choose 
between death and life imprisonment, it was not yet clear 
that one juror acting alone could prevent imposition of the 
extreme penalty. Before People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 453-
458 [249 P. 859], it was widely thought that the death penalty 
remained the norm, and that a unanimous jury was needed to 
reduce the penalty to life imprisonment, so that the juror's 
only course was to find the defendant not guilty. 
People v. Rollins, 179 Cal. 793, 795-796 [179 P. 209], also 
came before People v. Hall, and may be distinguished on the 
\ 
J 
Dec. 1956] PEOPLE t'. RISER 
(.7 C.2d 1ItI~; '110 P.2d 11 
575 
same ground as these other (':lSI'S. But the court articulated 
a broad reason for excluding fTt\\Il the jury those who are op-
posed to the death penalty, ewn though tbeir scruples would 
not .prevent their finding the tll.fendant guilty: cc [T]he dis-
er~tIon given to the jux:y [br § ]90] to provide for life im-
prISonment in such a case is Ilut an arbitrary discretion to 
be exercised without regard to Ole circullll~tances of the par-
~icu1ar ease, but only where it appears to the jury that there 
18 some eircUDlStance that WIlTJ'lInts or justifies the imposition 
of the lesser punishment." (179 Cal. at 796.) General views 
of the social desirability or moral permissibility of capital 
punis~ent could logically hn\'c no place among .the factors 
m:8uencmg the exercise of a cliscretion so conceIved. (See 
also People v. Collins, 105 Cnl. 504, 512 [39 P. 16] ; People 
v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 148 1 a P. 597, 52 Am.Rep. 295] ; ct· 
People v. Tanner, 2 Cal. 257, 258-260.) Our decisions since 
the Rollins ease have without discussion systematically ex-
cluded jurors opposed to tIlll death pcnalty, apparently ac-
cepting the reasoning of the ]tOlliIlS ease in regard to the rela-
tion between sectioIlS 190 aml 1074, subdivision 8. (People 
v. Riley, 35 Ca1.2d 279, 284 1217 P.2d 625] ; People v. Hoyt, 
20 Cal.2d 306, 318 [125 P.2d 29] ; People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 
731, 744-745 [104 P.2d 794], cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703 [61 
S.Ct. 806, 85 L.Ed. 1136].) 
We have recently critich'!ll(l this interpretation of section 
190 in People v. Green 47 CIl1.2d 209 [302 P.2d 307], hold-
ing it error to instruct ~ jury that it must find mitigating cir': 
eumstances in a case to jURtify fixing the punishment at life 
imprisonment. [1] Section 190 does not impose the death 
penalty, leaving discretion with the jury to substitute a lesser 
penalty; it imposes neither death nor )ife imprisonment, but 
with a perfectly even hand presents the two alternatives to 
the jury. The Legislature pl!rhaps because of the very gravity 
of the choice, has formul~t(!d no rules to control the exercise 
of the jury's discretion. 
[2] We did not suggeflt in the Green case, however, that 
section 190 did not require of the jurors a meaningful choice 
between these alternative!!, a choice fundamentaUy based on 
the evidence and made during and not before deliberation on 
the verdict. The statute ealls for the exercise of a legal discre-
tion, not for the unswerving application of views formulated 
before trial that will coml'd a certain result no matter what 
the trial may reveal. 
[3] Admittedly, a litl'~Tal reading of section 1074, sub-
.-
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division 8, does not compel the exclusion of jurors incapable 
of exercising the discretion contemplated by section 190.-
It would be doing violence to the purpose of these sections of 
the Penal Code, however, to construe section 1074, subdivision 
8, to permit these jurors to serve. It would in all probability 
work a de facto abolition of capital punishment, a result 
which, whether or not desirable of itself, it is hardly appro-
priate for this court to achieve by construction of an ambigu-
ous statute. 
Defendant contends that the admission in evidence of cer-
tain guns, holsters, belts, and shells was erroneous on the 
ground that they were not relevant to any issue in the ease. 
On the morning of July 23rd, almost two weeks after the 
homicides, police found in Roscoe's Chrysler a brief ease con-
taining three holsters, two leather belts, each with twelve 
rounds of .38 special shells, a box of .22 shells, and fifty-nine 
.38 special shells. Two more .38 shells were found in the seat 
of the automobile. On the same day police arrested Richard 
and seized a loaded Colt .38 revolver in his possession. Later, 
following directions given them by Roscoe, they discovered 
a P38 automatic with a clip of shells in a cesspool. The court 
overruled objections to testimony describing the finding of 
these objects and also admitted them into evidence. 
[4] Some of the .38 special shells contain bullets that 
were copper-coated factory loads, and others contained hand-
east lead bullets. There was expert testimony that the fac-
tory loads resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet 
found at the scene of the crime, and although the expert could 
not say that they came from the same box as that bullet, he did 
maintain that they were of the same type and from the same 
manufacturer. Defendant brought out that this type of bullet 
is in common use throughout the country; nevertheless, the 
similarity testified to by the expert, together with the prosecu-
tion's showing that the .38 shells found in the brief case would 
fit the type of revolver known to have been used in the kill-
ings, justified the trial court's admitting the factory loads. 
[5] The relevancy of the hand-cast bullets was even clearer. 
There was expert testimony, based on spectroscopic analysis 
*The awkwardness of testing the juror by use of the exact language 
of eeetion 1074, subdivision 8, was made abundantly clear in the present 
ease. Time and again the court questioned the juror in the statutory 
language, and time and again the juror replied that he did not entertain 
BUch an opinion "as would prevent him futding the defendant guilty." 
Finally, in order to make it clear to the juror that he was being asked 
if he opposed the death penalty, the court was compelled to abandon 
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of the metal in the bullets, that those found in the brief case 
were probably poured from the same batch of lead as the 
hand-cast bullets found at the scene of the crime. The expert 
found "a remarkable resemblance." 
[6] As to the holsters, experts testified that markings in 
People's Exhibit No. 26 indicated that it had once carried 
a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver. Even if this is a 
popular gun, we cannot say that possession of the holster was 
not relevant to the issue of the Risers' possessioJl of the murder 
weapon. 
The prosecution's own witness established that the bullets 
found at the scene of the crime had been fired from a Smith 
and Wesson .38 Special revolver, not from either the Colt .38 
or the P38 that the court admitted into evidence. [7] When 
the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is not 
known, it may be permissible to admit into evidence weapons 
found in the defendant's possession some time after the crime 
that could have been the weapons employed. There need be 
no con elusive demonstration that the weapon in defendant's 
possession was the murder weapon. (People v. Ferdinand, 
194 Cal. 555, 563 [229 P. 341] ; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 
113-114 [193 P. 92].) [8] When the prosecution relies, 
however, on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit 
evidence that other weapons were found in his possession, for 
such evidence tends to show, not that he committed the crime, 
but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly 
weapons. (People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113, 121 [112 P. 862] ; 
People v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 1, 5 [62 P. 297] ; People v. Yee 
Flook Din, 106 Cal. 163, 165-167 [39 P. 530] ; People v. Wong 
Ak Leong, 99 Cal. 440 [34 P. 105].) People v. Beltowski, 
'l1 Cal.App.2d 18, 23 [162 P.2d 59], cited by the prosecution 
as contrary to this proposition, is adequately distinguished in 
People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 541-542 [169 P.2d 
44], on the ground that no speeificweapon was relied on in 
the Beltowski case. It was error therefore to admit the Colt, 
two of the holsters, the belts, and the box of .22 shells. The 
P3S was admissible on other grounds that appear below. 
[9] Defendant, however, was not prejudiced by these 
errors. The shells and one holster were clearly admissible, 
and from these the jury would have concluded that defendant 
possessed firearms. The admission of the Colt, more holsters, 
belts, and shells added little to the jury's knowledge gained 
from evidence correctly admitted. The introduction Of the 
C'f C.td-lII 
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Colt may have actually benefited defendant, for it provided 
an explanation for his possession of the .38 shells. An expert 
testified that these shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith 
and Wesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the 
jury might more easily have concluded that the ammunition 
was kept for a Smith and Wesson. 
Defendant next cites as prejudicial error the introduction 
of evidence of other crimes. On the stand defendant main-
tained that the only pistols he had ever owned were the Colt, 
the PS8, and a toy cap pistol, and he denied having a Smith 
and Wesson .88 Special. He stated that he had obtained the 
PS8 from a sailor in the New Viking Bar, and denied having 
told a police officer that he had taken it from Doc's Village, 
a different bar. Officer Dutil then testified that defendant 
had told him that he had taken the PS8 from Doc's Village on 
June 29, 1955. The prosecution followed this with testimony 
by the bartender at Doc's Village that the two brothers had 
robbed Doc's Village on June 29th, that each had been armed 
with a blue steel gun, and that they had taken away with 
them a PS8 kept behind the bar. Finally, the owner of Doc's 
Village identified the PS8 found in the cesspool as the one 
that had been kept behind the bar. 
[10] Evidence of other crimes is not admissible when it 
sole effect is to show a criminal disposition, but if it "tends 
logically and by reasonable inference to establish any fact 
material for the prosecution, or overcome any material fact 
sought to be proved by the defense, [it] is admissible al-
though it may connect the accused with an offense not in-
cluded in the charge." (People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 
609 [218 P.2<1 981] ; see People v. Citrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288 .• 
[294 P.2d 82].) . 
The cross-examination of defendant to discover whether 
he had ever owned a Smith and Wesson .38 Special and when 
he had acquired the PS8, and the testimony of the witnesses 
from Doc's Village, tended to establish that the Risers entered 
Doc's Village on June 29th armed with two blue steel guns; 
that they there acquired the PS8; that therefore they had at 
one time been in possession of three guns, and that only two 
of these were known not to have been Smith and Wesson .88 
Specials. [11] The PS8 was admissible to corroborate the 
bartender's testimony that the Risers acquired the PS8 at 
a time when they already had two guns. This evidence that 
the Risers had a third gun of unknown make was relevant to 
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PeopZe v. Simeone, 26 Ca1.2d 795, 804-805 {161 P.2d 369].) 
The trial court closely limited the effect of the testi-
mony on the Doc's Village incident to showing how the 
Risers were armed and when they obtained the P3S, and 
specifically instructed the jury against drawing broad in-
ferences of criminal tendencies. The court's further limita-
tion of the testimony to purposes of impeachment was, if any-
thing, unduly favorable to defendant. 
Roscoe Riser also took the stand. On direct examination 
he stated that he had never been involved in a robbery; on 
cross-examination the district attorney gave detailed descrip-
tions of numerous robberies committed in San Francisco by 
R{)scoe and Richard, intermittently asking Roscoe if he had 
not furnished these descriptions in admitting the robberies 
to the police. Roscoe denied the prior inconsistent statements. 
[12] Defendant complains that the court should hav!' 
immediately instructed the jury that these references to his 
participation in robberies could in no way be used against 
him, since the prosecution did not show that he had been 
present when Roscoe was interrogated. Throughout the trial 
the court, whenever requested to do so, instructed clearly 
and at length that statements made by one defendant were 
not evidence against another defendant who had not been 
present, and it repeated this warning in its general instructions 
at the close of the trial. There is no reason to suppose that 
the jury, even though not reinstructed at this particular 
juncture, did not understand and apply the general principle 
the court had laid down. Furthermore, since defendant did 
not request the court to repeat its warning at this time, he 
cannot now complain.· 
[13] Defendant says that it was misconduct for the 
prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that Roscoe had in 
fact made the statements attributed to him; that since the 
prosecutor apparently had neither the intention nor the 
means of establishing the truth of his allegations, he must 
have made them solely to inflame the jury against the brothers. 
(Cf. People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242, 24S-249 [246 P.2d 636],) 
We must assume, however, that in view of the court's in-
structions the jury did not consider defendant's alleged par-
ticipation in the robberies. The injury, if any, was to Roscoe, 
and his appeal is not now before us. 
As a further error, defendant complains of the admission 
in evidence of a bottle and a glass bearing fingerprints testi-
Aed to be the fingerprints of Richard Riser. Deputy Sheriff 
';680 .. 4'BoPLB tI. 'RIsBa. 
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Lochry identified the bottle and glass as articles that he haa: 
taken from the Hilltop Caf6. When he arrived at the Caf6, C 
early in the morning of July 12th, he found several bottles,·· 
glasses, and salt cellars on the bar. He dusted them for 
fingerprints, put them in a box, and locked the box in the 
sherifl"s identification truck. About 4 or 5 a. m. he returned 
to the . sherifi' 's office and put the articles in an open book 
case in an office that he shared with another police officer. 
This office was unlocked; it was :flanked on one side by an 
office shared by two or three persons, and on the other side 
by a hall leading to a general office. According to Lochry,· 
the evidence remained in the book ease approximately four 
hours, until about 8 :30 a. m., when it was removed and there-
after kept under lock and key or in the custody of specific 
persons. 
Defendant contends that in view of these facts the prosecu-
tion failed to establish continuous possession, which is a 
necessary foundation for the admission of demonstrative evi-
. dence; that since someone could have altered the prints or 
imposed wholly new ones during the four hours the glass and 
bottle were left unguarded in the book case, the prosecution 
has not sufficiently identified the prints as those that existed 
when the articles were removed from the bar. Defendant 
would require the prosecution to negative all possibility of 
tampering. 
[14] Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis 
of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the 
evid~ce found at the scene ·of the crime, and that between 
receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tamper-
ing (see People v. Coleman, 100 Cal.App.2d 797, 801 [224 
P.2d 837]; 21 AL.R.2d 1216, 1219, 1236-1237), but it has 
never been suggested by the cases, what the practicalities of 
proof could not tolerate, that this burden is an absolute one 
requiring the party to negative all possibility of tampering. 
(See, e.g., People v. Brown, 92 Cal.App.2d 360, 365 [206 P.2d 
1095] ; Oommonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [124 A. i 
Ifl3] .) 
[15] The burden on the party offering the evidence is 1 
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all : 
the circumstances into account including the ease or diffi-
culty with which the particular evidence could have been 
altered, it is reasonably certain that thpre was no alteration. 
The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when 
some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted 
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for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence 
analyzed was not the evidence originally received. Left to 
such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. (See 
Dobson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 114 Cal.App.2d 782, 785 
[251 P.2d 349] ; McGowan v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 
386, 389-392 [223 P.2d 862, 21 A.L.R.2d 1206]; People v. 
Smith, 55 Cal.App. 324, 327-329 [203 P. 816] ; Novak v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588 [82 App.D.C. 95].) [16] Con-
versely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tam-
pering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt 
remains go to its weight. (See People v. Tomasovich, 56 Cal. 
App. 520, 529 [206 P. 119] ; State v. Smith (Mo.), 222 S.W. 
455, 458-459.) [17] In the present case defendant did not 
point to any iIidication of actual tampering, did not show how 
fingerprints could have been forged, and did not establish 
that anyone who might have been interested in tampering 
with the prints knew that the bottles and glasses were in 
Deputy Sheriff Lochry's book case. There was no error in 
the court's ruling. 
[18] In the course of instructing the jury the court stated 
that" Although there are two degrees of murder, the evidence 
in this case is such that either both of the defendants, or one 
of them, is innocent of the charge of murder ... or one or both 
of the defendants are guilty of murder in the first degree . 
. • • For murder which is committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate • . . robbery • • • is murder of the 
first degree; whether the killing was intentional, unintentional 
or accidental." (See Pen. Code, § 189.) 
Defendant contends that it was error for the court thus 
to remove from the jury's consideration the degree of murder, 
and whether in fact it had been in the course of a robbery 
or attempted robbery. The evidence, however, was over-
whelming that the homicides had been committed in the 
perpetration of a robbery, and when there is no reasonable 
doubt on this issue the court is justified in withdrawing it 
from the jury. (People v. Sanford, 33 Ca1.2d 590, 595 [203 
P.2d 534]; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 516 [66 P.2d 
631] ; see People v. Rupp, 41 Ca1.2d 371, 381-382 [260 P.2d 1].) 
Defendant offered no evidence indicating that a robbery had 
not been committed, and in his own statement of facts to this 
court he says that "ilie killing took place during the com-
mission of a robbery." 
[19] In addition to this instruction on felony murder, 





cluding the provisions OD premeditated murder and second 
degree murder, and the code definition of robbery. (Pen. 
Code, §§ 189, 211.) These instructions were unnecessary 
because they covered questions that had already been with-
drawn from the jury by the first instruction. But if any 
COnfUSiOD was generated by these instructions, it could only 
have benefited defendant by leading the jury to think that 
the question of the degree of murder was still open to its 
determination. (See People v. Peterson, 29 Cal.2d 69, 78-79 
[173 P.2d 11], cert. denied, 331 U.S. 861 [67 S.Ct. 1751, 91 
L.Ed. 1867].) 
In the midst of its deliberations the jury returned to the 
courtroom and the following discussion took place between 
court and jury: 
"THE FOREMAN: The question was, under those circum-
stances would either of the defendants be eligible for parole 
if a recommendation was made for life imprisonment. 
"THE CoURT: I see. Well, the answer of the Court is for 
the purpose of determining the punishment and for that 
purpose, only, it is the law that a person convicted of First 
Degree Murder and sentenced to life imprisonment may be 
eligible for parole. Does that answer your question' 
"THE FOREMAN : Yea . 
. "THE CO'OBT: I might state that it further provides that 
they may be eligible for parole but not before he has served 
.even calendar years. Now, I just state that the law is worded 
that way." 
The next day the jury informed the court that it had one 
verdict complete as to one of the brothers. It then submitted 
a written question to the court asking whether "In the event 
of what is a verdict of guilty on both counts one and two, is 
there any recommendation the Jury can make that would pre-
clude the possibility of parole during the lifetime of a persOD 
convicted." The court answered, "No." Within an hour the 
jury returned its verdicts of guilty, fixing the punishment at 
life imprisonment for Roscoe, but with no specification of 
punishment for Richard. Under the instructions that were 
given the verdict as to Richard necessarily implied that the 
jury fixed the punishment at death. 
[20] It is now well established that although the jury 
may not weigh the possibility of pardon or parole in deter-
mining the guilt of an accused, it may consider these conse-
quences in exercising its discretion to choose between different 
punishment.. (Peopu v. Beese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117 
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[801 P.2d 582]; People T. Byrd, 42 Ca1.2d 200, 206-208[266 
P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 [75 S.Ot. 78, 99 L.Ed. 
668] ; People v. BarcZay, 40 Cal.2d 146, 158 [252 P.2d 321] ; 
People v. Osborn, ,37 Ca1.2d 380, 884-385 [231 P.2d 850].) 
[21] Defendant contends, however, that it was error for the 
court to give the jury information about eligibility for parole 
before it had determined the question of guilt or innocence. 
This contention is without merit. In both People v. Beese, 
supra, and People v. Byrd, supra, we upheld the trial court 
when it had included in its original instructions to the jury 
the information that one sentenced to life imprisonment could 
be paroled. In those cases, as in the present one, ~ court 
cautioned the jury against allowing this information to influ-
ence its determination of guilt. Prudence requires no more; 
it does not require that the jury be kept in ignorance of the 
consequences of different penalties until it has finally deter-
mined guilt. Moreover, it is by no means clear in the present 
case that the jury, when it addressed its questions to the court, 
had not already found defendant guilty. 
[22] Defendant also claims that the court misinformed the 
jury when it said that defendant could be paroled in seven 
years if sentenced to life imprisonment; that because of sec-
tions 3024, subdivision (b), and 3048 of the Penal Code, 
defendant could not be paroled in less than ten years. 
Section 3024, subdivision (b), provides that the minimum 
terms of sentence and imprisonment "for a person previously 
convicted of a felony either in this State or elsewhere,· and 
armed with a deadly weapon (is] ... 10 years ..•. " As 
we pointed out in PeopZe v. Beue, 47 Cal.2d 112, 117-118 
1301 P.2d 582], this provision is in an article of the code 
concerned with the length of sentences and the fixing thereof, 
and not with how much of a sentence must be served before 
a prisoner is eligible for parole. That subject is covered in 
a di1ferent article, embracing sections 3040 to' 3065. Section 
3049 provides that a person whose minimum term of imprison-
ment is more than one year may be paroled at any time after 
the expiration of one-third of the minimum term. Section 
3046 limits section 3049 by stating that no person imprisoned 
under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at 
least seven calendar years. Authority to grant parole after 
a certain portion of a minimum term has been served is not 
destroyed by a provision such as section 3024 which sets the 
minimum term itself. > 
Section 3048, also cited by defendant, limits eligibility for 
) 
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parole when a defendant has been adjudicated an habitual 
erimina1. Such an adjudication cannot be made unless the 
prior convictions on which it is to be based have been charged 
in the indictment. (PeopZe v. Wagner, 78 Ca1.App. 503, 
506-507 [248 P. 946].) No prior convictions were charged in 
the indictment in the present case, therefore section 3048 has 
no application. 
[is] Defendant's most serious objections go to the eye-
witness testimony of :Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel. One 
charge is that the prosecution improperly coached Mrs. 
Burgess into identifying defendant as the man she had seen 
at the Hilltop. Mrs. Burgess identified defendant in a Stock-
ton police lineup. She admitted that after this Lieutenant 
Kilroy had been to her house on numerous occasions, shown 
her pictures and taken her for rides, and that after her appear-
ance before the grand jury the district attomey had cJiseussed 
her testimony with her on several occasions. There is no evi-
dence, however, that she was prepared in any way before the 
lineup, and she specifically denied having seen pictures of 
defendant before that time; This evidence is insofIicient 
to justify a conclusion that Mrs. Burgess' identification was 
the result of an idea planted in her mind by the prosecution. 
Before trial defendant moved for an order direeting the 
prosecution to furnish him with a copy of the fingerprint 
taken from the bottle, and directing the sheri1f'. office of 
Stanislaus County to allow him to inspect statemen1s made 
to police by Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel immediately after 
the homicides. The motion was denied. 
After cross-examination of witnesses Burgess and Pantel, ~.\ 
defendant had issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to .. 
Captain Ross of the sheriJf's office commanding him to pro-
duce the originals of the same statemen1s sought by the 
pretrial motion. The aftidavit in support of the subpoena 
asserted that the statements were material and relevant to 
issues in the case and contradictory to the witnesses' present 
testimony. Defendant first leamed of the statements from 
local newspapers, which reported Captain Ross as saying that 
the witnesses had described the man who did the shooting as 
tall and slender, with a dark complexion and black hair, and 
the other man as dark complexioned with black hair. Appar-:i 
ently the Riser brothers have blond hair and light complexions, .~: 
and dif£er significantly in other characteristics from the news-
paper descriptions. On cross-examination Mrs. Burgess ad- . 
mitted having made a statement to the police. She claimed, 
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however, that she described the man who did the shooting 
as stocky, not as tall and slender, and although she admitted 
describing the man by the door as dark complexioned, she 
denied having said that he had black hair. 
The prosecution moved for an order vacating the subpoena. 
Despite defendant's argument that he was entitled to the 
statements for purposes of impeachment, the motion was 
granted on the ground that the subpoena sought to bring into 
court evidence that could not be used for impeachment and 
was not otherwise admissible. Defendant contends that this 
order was erroneous. 
Originally at common law the accused in a criminal 
action could not compel production of doeuments or other 
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. (See 6 Wig-
more, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 475-476; 8 ide at 219-220.) 
Production was denied before trial on the ground that to 
compel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand would 
enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and fabri-
cated evidence to meet the state's ease. It was felt, further-
more, that to allow the defendant to compel production when 
the prosecution could not in its turn compel production from 
the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimina-
tion would unduly shift to the defendant's side a balance of 
advantages already heavily weighted in his favor. (See gener-
ally Btate v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203 [98A.2d 881] ; Btate ez ret 
Bo'bBrl,on V. BteeZ, 117 Kinn. 384 [185 N.W. 1128, Ann.Cas. 
1913D 343];6 Wigmore, Evidence, .upra, at 475-476.) 
. [94] Whatever the force.of these arguments when directed 
to pretrial discovery, they have little or no application when . 
produetion is sought by subpoena during trial of statements 
referred to on cross-examination. The question then is not 
whether the defendant will be allowed advance disclosure of 
evidence upon which the prosecution plans to base its ease, but 
whether he will be allowed any disclosure of evidence that the 
proseeution does not intend to produce in court at all. (See 
United Statu v. KruZewitck, 145 F.2d 76, 78 [156 A.L.R. 
337].) Furthermore, the additional possibility that the de-
fendant will obtain perjured testimony or fabricated evidence 
as a nsult of disclosure at this point in the proceedings is too 
slight to justify denying production. [25] The decisions of 
this ecmrt have always impliedly recognized that on a proper 
showing a defendant in a criminal case can compel production 
when it becomes clear during the course of trial that the 
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App. 541, 543-544 [250 P. 406] ; Peopk v. NieJ,cu, 70 Cal.App. 
191 [232 P. 985] ; People v. Emmons, 7 Cal.App. 685, 690-
691 [95 P. 1032].) [27] Nor do we think that the impeach-
ment justifying production is necessarily restricted to impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent statements to the exclusion, for 
example, of impeachment for bias. (See .Asg~"ll v. United 
States, supra, 60 F.2d at 779.) 
[28a] In the present case the court denied production on 
the ground that the statements could not be used to impeach 
the witnesses. We are at a loss to understand how the court 
could have reached this conclusion without even seeing the 
statements. Whether they were in writing or signed by the 
witnesses the record does not show, and it is safe to say that 
no one but the prosecution knew. Even if they were not signed, 
defendant might have been able to show, by the testimony of 
a stenographer or other witnesses or by the admissions of 
Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel themselves, that the statements 
had been accurately transcribed and therefore could be used 
for impeachment. (See Peopk v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal.App.2d 
519, 534-535 [180 P.2d 443]; People v. Orosco, 73 Cal. 
App. 580, 593 [239 P. 82].) 
[29] Obviously a defendant cannot show conclusively that 
a document is admissible without seeing it, and yet in order 
to see it he is told that he must show that it is admissible. 
The proper test for determining whether production must 
be granted is not whether the evidence has been conclusively 
proved admissible but whether, as stated in People v. Glaze, 
lUpt"a, at 158, "there is good reason to believe that the docu-
ment when produced would be admissible in evidence for some 
purpose in the case. . . ." There must be more than a mere 
possibility that the statements when produced will contain 
contradictory matter and be in such a form that they can be 
used to impeach, but the chance that it may turn out even-
tually that they cannot be used for this purpose should not 
block production at the threshold. 
This precise problem, the relation between admissibility 
and the right to production, was presented in Gordon v. 
United Slates, $upra, and the court there concluded that the 
prosecution had not conceded enough in admitting that it 
would be error to refuse to order production if it would be 
error not to admit the evidence once produced. "[P]roduc-
tion may sometimes be required though inspection may show 
that the document could properly be excluded." ,(344 U.S. 
\ ) 
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at 418.) As in the ease before us, the oeurt was facea with 
a record that showed no reason why the statements once pro-
duced could not be used for impeachment. 
[28b] That the statements of Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel 
existed and were in the possession of the prosecution or the 
pollee was never denied; that it was probable that they were 
inconsistent with the witnesses' testimony was shown by the 
newspaper accounts. Defendant was unable to prove con-
clusively that the statements were in a form warranting use 
for impeachment only because the prosecution kept them in 
its exclusive control. The prosecution did not claim that the 
necessities of law enforcement required that the statements 
be kept confidential, and in view of the fact that the police 
had released the substance of the statements to the press, there 
could be no such claim. Defendant was not exploring for 
generally useful information, but demanded particular docu-
ments reasonably thought to be usable for the specific pur-
pose of impeachment. Finally, defendant went as far as he 
could without benefit of the statements, at least in the ease 
of Mrs. Burgess. Once the witness denied the prior incon-
sistencies, there was nothing further defendant could do to 
press the impeachment. It does not appear that ther.e were 
any witnesses to the statements who could recall exactly what 
had been said, and even if there were defendant was not com-
peD.ed to rely on them if far more impressive documentary 
proof was at hand. We conclude that defendant sustained 
the burden imposed on him and that it was error to vacate 
the subpoena. . 
[.3Oa] In deciding whether this error was prejudicial we 
must determine whether there was a reasonable probability 
that the jury would have reached a dDferent verdict had· de-
fendant been allowed to obtain and introduce in evidence 
prior inconsistent statements of the eyewitnesses. (People 
v. Watson, 46 CaLM 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Even if we 
assume that prior inconsistent statements would have im-
paired the value of the eyewitness testimony, there remained 
against defend~t the fingerprint evidence, the evidence that 
he possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a common 
origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime and a 
holster that had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38 Special, 
and the evidence that he had had a gun in addition to those 
he admitted owning. 
Weighed against this evidence was the testimony of the 
Risers that they had not been at the Hilltop on July 11th. 
) 
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Both stated that they had been at the house of Della Fay 
Jones, Roscoe's girl friend, until 7 :30 or 8 o'clock in the 
evening, and then had gone on, Roscoe and Della to a movie 
and Richard on a round of Stockton bars. Richard returned 
home about midnight and did not see Roscoe until the next 
morning. Della Fay Jones did not testify. 
Richard had earlier told police that it was probably on the 
11th that he and Roscoe had gone to Riverbank to buy fur-
niture, returning to Stockton by way of Oakdale where they 
stopped at a bar. At the trial he explained that he had 
been confused about the dates as a result of almost continuous 
questioning by the police for three or four days. Roscoe 
could not recall the Riverbank expedition at all. 
Witness Basford testified that the two men he met coming 
into the Hilltop Cafe had been in a Chrysler, Buick or 
Pontiac. Both brothers testified that Roscoe's Chrysler had 
a flat tire on the 11th, and Roscoe said that it had been left 
in the backyard of their mother's house from the 10th until 
the 13th, while they used an old Dodge converted into a 
truck. Their mother stated that the Chrysler had been in 
the yard from the 10th to the 13th, and that if it had been 
removed it could only have been while she was asleep. A 
witness for the prosecution testified that he had seen the 
brothers getting into the Chrysler on the afternoon or evening 
of the 11th, but on cross-examination his testimony proved 
extremely weak. . 
[31] Fingerprin't evidence is the atrongest evidence of 
identity, and is ordinarily 811fticient alone to identify the de-
fendant. (See People v. Adamson, 2'7 Ca1.2d 478, 495 [165 
P.2d 8], affd. 832 U.S. 4:6 [67 S.Ot. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 
A.L.R.1223].) [BOb] Here there is in addition to the finger-
print evidence the evidence of a common origin for the hand-
cast bullets, a "remarkable resemblance" which we have no 
reason to believe could be the result of chance. The evidence 
that the holster had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38 
Special, and that defendant had possessed an unidentified 
third gun, although not as strong as the fingerprint and bullet 
evidence, contribute to an impressive total of proof identify-
ing defendant. We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is not 
reasonably probable that the jury, faced with this evidence, 
would have chosen to believe instead the unsupported testi-
moD1' of defendant that he had not been at the Hilltop Cafe 
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on the night of July 11th; accordingly, there has been no mis 
carriage of justice. (Oal. Qonst., art. VI, § 4¥.a.) 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, O. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McOomb, J. 
con~urred. 
OARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by a majori 
of this court that while it was error it was not prejudicia 
error for the trial court to deny defendant the right to produc 
documents containing statements by eyewitnesses allegedl 
contrary to those made at the trial by such witnesses. I 
my opinion nothing could be more prejudicial. It is im-
possible for an appellate court to say that the jury was not 
impressed by testimony which absolutely identified the de-
fendant as the perpetrator of the crime given by persons 
present at the time the crime was committed. 
In view of the holding in Gordo'n v. Uniteil States, 344 U.S. 
414 [73 S.Ot. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447], it seems incredible that a 
majority of this court could hold that this error was not 
prejudicial. The same problem was there presented. The 
cOUrt had this to say: "By proper cross-examination, defense 
counsel laid a foundation for his demand by showing that 
the documents were in existence, were in possession of the 
Government, were made by the Government's witness under 
examiDstion, were contradictory of his present testimony, and 
that the contradiction was as to relevant, important and 
material matters which directly bore on the main issue being 
tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The 
demand was for production of these specific documents and 
did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among 
documents possessed by the Government on the chance that 
something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a de-
mand for statements taken from persons or informants not 
offered as witnesses. The Government did not assert any 
privilege for the documents on grounds of national security, 
confidential character, public interest, or otherwise .••• 
Indeed, we would find it hard to withstand the force of Judge 
Oooley's observation in a similar situation that 'The State 
has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure 
of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused 
parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.' [PeopZe 
v. DtwiI, 52 Mich. 569 (18 N.W. 362, 363).] In the light 
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of our reason and experience, the better rule is that upon 
the foundation that was laid the court should have overruled 
the objections which the Government advanced and ordered 
production of the documents. 
"The trial court, of course, had no occasion to rule as to 
their admissibility, and we find it appropriate to consider that 
question only because the Government argues that the trial 
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, might have excluded 
these prior contradictory statements and, since that would 
not have amounted to reversible error, it was not such to 
decline their production. We think this misconceives the issue. 
It is unnecessary to decide whether it would have been re-
versible error for the trial judge to exclude these statements 
once they had been produced and inspected. For production 
purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant, 
competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule; for rarely 
can the trial judge understandingly exercise his discretion 
to exclude a document which he has not seen, and tlO appeUate 
cou.rl could ratiOftally say 10hether the ezclucling of emaence 
unknown to the record 10GB error, or, if '0, WGB harmless. The 
question to be answered on an application for an order to 
produce is one of admissibility under traditional canons of 
evidence, and not whether exclusion might be overlooked as 
harmless error. 
"The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that Mar-
shall's admission, on cross-examination, of the implicit contra-
diction between the documents and his testimony removed the 
need for resort to the statements and the admission was an 
the accused were entitled to demand. We cannot agree. We 
think that an admission that a contradiction is contained in 
a writing should not bar admission of the document itself in 
evidence, providing it meets all other requirements of ad-
missibility and no valid claim of privilege is raised against 
it. The elementary wisdom of the best evidence rule rests 
on the fact that the document is a more reliable, complete 
and accurate source of information as to its contents and 
meaning than anyone's description and this is no less true 
as to the extent and circumstances of a contradiction. We 
hold that the accused is entitled to the appliCation of that 
rule, not merely because it will emphasize the contradiction 
to the jury, but because it will best inform them as to the 
document's impeaching weigl,tt and significance. Traditional 
rules of admissibility prevent opening the door to documents 
which merely differ on immaterial matters. The oZleged 
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contradictions to this witness' testimony relate not to col-
lateral matters but to the tlery incrimination of petitioners." 
(Emphasis added; pp. 418-421.) It was concluded: "The 
Government, in its brief, argues strongly for the widest sort 
of discretion in the trial judge in these matters and urges 
that even if we find error or irregularity we disregard it as 
harmless and affirm the conviction. We are well aware of the 
necessity that appellate courts give the trial judge wide lati-
tude in control of cross-examination, especially in dealing with 
collateral evidence as to character. Michelson v. United States, 
335 U.S. 469 [69 S.Ot. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168]. But this principle 
cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from 
the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trust-
worthiness of crucial testimony. Reversals should not be 
based on trivial, theoretical and harmless rulings. But we 
cannot say that these errors were unlikely to have influenced 
the jury's verdict. We believe they prejudiced substantial 
rights and the judgment must be Reversed." (Pp. 422-423.) 
The eyewitness testimony was by far the most important 
evidence against this defendant. The murder weapon was 
never found; the similarity in the hand~cast bullets was only 
that they were "probably of common origin"; and it was 
thought that defendant's holster had once carried a gun of 
a type of the murder weapon. It would appear to me that, 
in Judge Oooley's language, the state should have no interest 
in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of facts; that all 
material and relevant facts should be set forth for the deter-
mination of the jury and, if certain state witnesses have been 
accused of making contradictory statements relating to a 
material fact, those statements should also be before the jury 
so that it could determine for itself the trustworthiness of such 
witnesses. The American concept of due process most cer-
tainly encompasses the right of an accused to be confronted 
by trustworthy witnesses and the right to show, if he can, 
that witnesses against him may not be worthy of belief. Due 
process most certainly also encompasses the concept that the 
state will not seek to conceal material evidence in the accused's 
favor. If due process of law does not encompass such con-
cepts, then we have most assuredly departed a long way from 
the very foundation upon which our system of justice rests-
the ideal th~t every man is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the words of Mr. Justice 
Holmes (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 [48 S.Ct. 
564, '12 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376]), it is better that one 
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criminal escape than that the government play an ignoble part. 
In Mesarosk v. United States (25 L.W. 4001, 4004, 4005) 
the government moved to remand the case to the trial eourt 
because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals 
by Mazzei, a government witness, although contending that 
the testimony given in the instant case by Mazzei was "entirely 
truthful and credible." The government sought to have the 
matter remanded to the District Court for a full consideration 
of the credibility of the testimony of the witness Mazzei. The 
counter-motion of petitioners asked for a new trial. In revers-
ing the judgments below with directions to grant the peti-
tioners a new trial, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for 
the court, had this to say: "Mazzei, by his testimony, has 
poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot 
be cleansed without :first draining it of all impurity. This is 
a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory juris-
diction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has 
any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters 
of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here, 
the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity. 
'The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of 
the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance 
is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with 
supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal 
courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63 S.Ct. 
608, 87 L.Ed. 819]. Therefore, fastidious regard for the 
honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to 
make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest 
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be 
asserted.' Oommunist Party v. Subversive Activities Oontrol 
Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124 [76 s.Ot. 663, 100 L.Ed. 1003]. 
"The government of a strong and free nation does not need 
convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to 
abide with them. The interests of justice call for a reversal 
of the judgments below with direction to grant the petitioners 
a new trial. " 
Surely the great State of California does not need convic-
tions based upon the deprivation of an accused's constitutional 
right to due process of law. 
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
30, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
